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Distributive justice combines philosophy, economics, and jurisprudence 
in an attempt to establish the fundamental theory by which wealth and 
resources are allocated among the members of a society. The need for a 
rationally based distributive system to allocate resources in an organized 
society arises from the insufficiency of available resources to fulfill the 
conflicting desires of society members. Despite the adoption of various 
distributive theories through the centuries, the question of what constitutes 
a just distributive system remains unanswered.
Utilitarianism, egalitarianism, socialism, and Marxism are among the 
theories which* have had the greatest impact on modem social thinking. 
These theories are complex, and criticism of their assumptions and impli­
cations is outside the scope of this article. They are mentioned merely to 
indicate the central role in structuring a society’s institutions played by 
the basic theory of distributive justice adopted. It is undeniable that the 
.search for more coherent theories of distributive justice continues and that 
the need for more acceptable and workable alternatives is a real one, par­
ticularly in an era of changing social values and political organizations, 
and global allocation of scarce economic and natural resources. The ob­
jective of this article is to analyze the distributive justice concepts de­
veloped by John Rawls,1 and to discuss the adaptation of such concepts 
to the American experience by briefly examining the implications of 
Rawls’s theory for some basic institutions of this society.
I .  F a il u r e s  o f  T h e  A m e r ic a n  D is t r ib u t iv e  J u s t ic e  Sy s t e m
The United States has long benefited from a state of abundance and 
the implementation and operation of reasonably just institutions, which* 
have created a situation of relative well being and just distribution in com­
parison to other nations. Nevertheless, the need for change and revitaliza­
tion of some traditional American ideals is becoming increasingly ap­
parent. The civil rights movement, the national perception that our par­
ticipation in the war in Southeast Asia was wrong, the manifest disaffec­
tion with a political process dependent upon and distorted by privately 
raised campaign funds, the growing realization that our penal systems are 
not only inhumane but ineffective, and the consumer movement, are but 
a few indications of a culture seeking to implement a  renewed and refined 
standard of justice in its institutions. But debate on these and similar 
issues has seldom proceeded from a commonly held sense of justice; for
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1 J .  R a w l s , A T h e o r y  o f  J u s t ic e  (1971).
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tKat reason, proposed remedies have not often been generally acceptable 
and workable. Thus, it should not be surprising that divisions among 
people of good will are many, confusion and lack of purpose are preva­
lent, and confidence in our institutions is declining.
Relatively recent political efforts such as the New Deal and the War 
on Poverty2 have made halting steps toward implementing a more just 
distribution of goods in our society, but with little fundamental or long 
lasting success. The great and growing inequalities of distribution in 
America and the world can no longer be justified to most members of our 
society. One indication of the unjust distribution of goods is the persistent 
and growing maldistribution of wealth. Although measurement of the 
degree of economic inequality is crude in light of the countless factors 
which must be considered,3 research to date indicates a grossly unjust and 
unjustifiable distribution of wealth'.4
One study5 found that 1.6 percent of our population owned about 
thirty-two percent of all privately owned wealth, 82.2 percent of all stock, 
one hundred percent of tax exempt bonds, 38.2 percent of all federal 
bonds, 88.5 percent of other kinds of bonds, 29.1 percent of all cash, and 
22.1 percent of all debts and mortgages. Subsequent studies indicate the 
concentration of wealth in a few hands may be intensifying.6 Statistically, 
the top ten percent of the American population receives twenty-eight per­
cent of the income while the bottom ten percent receives two percent of 
the income, a ratio of fourteen to one that has persisted for several 
decades.7 Other indications of distributive injustice in the United States 
abound. For example, the social security expenditures of European com­
munity countries are approximately fourteen percent of their gross 
national product, and those of Canada ten percent, while the United 
States spends only 6.5 percent.
Examined on a worldwide basis, the statistics — even though they are 
crude and perhaps misleading — are truly appalling. Fully sixty percent 
of the world's population has an annual income of less than $310 per 
year in terms of 1970 U.S. dollars. Although these numbers are not 
easily translated into the American standard of living, one expert in the 
field has stated:
T h e  inescapable conclusion is th a t  the  benefits of economic progress have
been confined to a  m inority  of the  w orld’s population. T h e  application
2 See Smolensky, Poverty, Propinquity and Policy, 409 A n n a l s  120 (1973).
3 See Boulding, Equality and Conflict, 409 An n a l s  1 (1973),
* See Symposium, Income Inequality, 409 A n n a l s  1—173 (1973).
BR . L a m pm a n , C h a n g e s  in  t h e  Sh a r e  o f  W e a l t h  H eld  by  T o p  W e a l t h - 
H o ld er s, 1922—56 (Nat’I Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Occasional Paper 71, 
1960). The data cited in text was for 1953. Id. at 6.
eF. L un dberg , T h e  R ic h  and  t h e  Su p e r -R ic h  11 (1968); Lampman, Measured 
Inequality of Income: What Does It Mean and What Can I t Tell Us, 409 A n n a l s  81,
82 (1973),
7 Lampman, supra note 6, a t 82.
8Heilbroner, The Roots of Social Neglect in the United States, in Is L a w  D ea d
288 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
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of modem science and technology has not, nearly three-quarters of the 
way through, the twentieth century, provided anything which approxi­
mates the western minimum standard of living for the substantial 
majority of the human race.8
Aside from any concepts of justice, such gross maldistribution and 
Human suffering is dangerous to the stability of existing institutions. It 
sKould not be surprising that a 1973 poll found that more than three- 
fourths of the American people believe the rich get richer, and the poor, 
poorer; almost the same number believe that special interests get more out 
of the government than the people do. The depth of alienation from our 
institutions and leadership, and the degree to which individuality has 
become submerged in our society was indicated by the belief of sixty-one 
percent of those surveyed that their opinions have little influence and the 
belief of fifty-five percent that the people running the country do not 
care what happens to them. The results of this poll led the Wall Street 
Journal to opine, “America may be ripe for the man on horseback.”8 
Clearly, the maldistribution of wealth and perceptions of injustice just 
described require a reassessment of the goals and distributive principles 
followed by this society. That the distribution of wealth* in America is 
relatively just in comparison to the rest of the world should not obscure 
tKe need for change nor blunt the search for alternative systems to accom­
plish that change. A widespread acceptance of changes and restructuring 
of the socio-economic system is dependent upon the adoption of some new 
ideal of distributive justice with solid philosophical and rational founda­
tions. Although it would be desirable to suggest such' changes on the basis 
of principles derived from unassailable premises, that luxury is not avail­
able in the area of distributive justice.10 All theories are subject to criti­
cism on a philosophical and rational level and, if implemented in past or 
present social systems, to criticism for their practical results. Among the 
possible alternatives for a distributive process, the concepts of socialism11 
and Marxism12 must be eliminated as viable political alternatives for
0 Otten, Politics and People, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 10, 1974*, a t 10, col. 3.
u As Felix Cohen has observed, “truth on earth is a matter of degree, a n d . . .  what­
ever may be the case in Heaven, a terrestrial major league batting average above .300 
is nothing to be sneezed at.” Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 Y a l e  L .J .  
238, 268 (1950).
11 The socialist fonnula can be simply stated as: A just distributive system is one 
in which everyone produces according to his ability and receives according to his need. 
This formula, attributed to the French socialist Louis Blanc, is usually criticized as 
not providing for sufficient incentive or reward for merit. For a  general criticism' of 
socialism, see N. Bo w ie * T o w a r d s  A N e w  T h e o r y  o f  D is t r ib u t iv e  J u s t ic e  77—99
(1971).
13 Mandsm is more complex than socialism because it divides the distributive theory 
into two phases: the first to be applied during a period of economic development, the 
other during a subsequent period of abundance. Id. a t 79. In  the preabundance phase, 
the distribution of wealth gives to each person according to his work without any 
value being retained by the employer. See K. M arx , C a p it a l  chs. 9,. 12, 19 (190&). 
In  the second phase, the distributive formula is essentially that of socialism. Marxism 
is subject to the same criticisms as socialism, note 11 supra, and is also criticized for 
its inefficiency and for ignoring important distributive factors such as health, family 
size, and special needs. Moreover, experience seems to indicate that the drive in a
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American society. The American people do not now seem disposed to 
accept the extensive regulatory emphasis of a socialist or Marxist method 
of organizing economic activity. The complexity of the American econo­
my and periodic experience with' such pervasive government regulation 
as wage and price controls indicate that public policy favoring a free 
market will remain the major ingredient for organizing American eco­
nomic activity for the foreseeble future. For many of the same reasons, 
egalitarian principles13 do not seem a viable alternative. Utilitarianism,14 
which is probably generally accepted by most Western societies, seems 
unsupportable in light of the extremely unequal distributions which it 
would allow and the growing awareness of the excesses of maximizing 
measurable economic pleasures to the injury or exclusion of other values 
a mature society should promote. An alternative theory of distributive 
justice is proposed by John Rawls in his book, A T h eo ry  of Justice.™ 
Rawls rejects functional or negative approaches to the development 
of a theory of distributive justice in favor of a rational approach, which 
attempts to explain our intuitive convictions of the best political system. 
His theory articulates the American ideal of a written constitution guar­
anteeing liberty and equality of opportunity by fragmenting and con­
trolling power in society through institutional devices. Rawls’s work deals 
primarily with the search for, and statements of, the principles of justice 
which should regulate the institutions of a just society; it does not attempt 
to explore the intricacies of individual justice?16 or to explain how social 
arrangements have come about. Rawls believes that the main function 
of a set of principles of justice is to define just procedures to be applied 
to concrete situations instead of providing a direct solution for such prob­
lems.
Marxist society for an economically classless society is incompatible with the objective 
of maximizing individual liberty.
33 Egalitarianism, in whatever form expressed, either requires an equal distribu­
tion scheme or allows an unequal one only if it is not based upon consideration of 
special merits or talents. I t also de-emphasizes the psychological imperatives of in­
centives. The primary criticism of such a model is that it is inefficient in an economic 
sense. For various formulations of the egalitarian principle and its criticism, see N. 
B ow ie , supra note 11, at 50—76.
14 T h e  p rin c ip a l ten e t o f u tilita rian ism  can  be s ta ted  a s : “ I n  a  se t o f possible dis­
tribu tions, th a t  d is tribu tion  w hich  w ill p rov ide  th e  g rea test happiness fo r th e  g rea test 
n u m b er is th e  one w h ich  is ju s t.” Id . a t  12. T w o  p rim ary  weaknesses m ake accep t­
ance o f th e  doc trine  doub tfu l. F irst, i t  is a lm ost im possible to  m easure  happiness in  a  
m ean ingfu l w ay; hence th e  p roblem  of m axim izing happiness is n o t am enable to  a n  
ac tu a l solution. Second, d is tribu tive  systems can  be  crea ted  w hich  w ould  satisfy th e  
d octrine  b u t  w ould  n o t ap p ea l to  an y  presen tly  h e ld  sense of ju stice . T h e  u tilitarian , 
d o c trin e  w as first developed in  w h a t is  know n as th e  classical fo rm  a n d  was la te r  
m odified  in to  th e  “average u tilita rian ism .” C lassical u tilita rian ism  is concerned w ith  
th e  m axim um  satisfaction  of th e  largest n um ber of people. See H . S idgw igk , T h e  
M e t h o d  o f  E t h i c s  (7 th  ed. 1907). T h e  d isadvan tage  o f classical u tilita rian ism  is 
th a t  a  decreasing average  am o u n t o f in d iv idua l sa tisfaction  is perm issible so long as 
a n  ever increasing  p o p u la tio n  results in  a n  ever increasing  to ta l satisfaction. A verage 
u tilita rian ism  corrects th e  m a jo r flaw  by requ iring  th a t  th e  average  ind iv idual satis­
fac tion  be  m axim ized. See J .  M i l l ,  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  (1 9 5 7 ) . F o r  a  b rie f exp lana tion  
o f u tilita rian ism  a n d  its  in h e ren t problem s, see N . B ow ie , supra n o te  11, a t  12-49.
15 J. R a w l s ,  supra n o te  1.
18 “I shall not consider the justice of institutions and social practices generally. . . . ” 
Id . at 7.
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Rawls5 theory of justice is founded upon the social contract tradition of 
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant,17 and is offered as an alternative to the utili­
tarian tradition of Hume, Smith, Bentham, and Mill. The greatest virtue 
of his work is that it formalizes and gives some rational support to ideas 
and ideals which are widely held. In this respect, his conclusions, although 
they may appear radical to some, have the advantage of being capable 
of incorporation into existing constitutional systems without the trauma of 
dramatic change. The aim of this article is to analyze briefly the stan­
dards of justice which Rawls derives and to suggest how some existing 
institutions of American society could be modified, within the practical 
limitations of present political and social realities, to approach the ideals 
of Rawls’s theory.
Criticism of such a sophisticated and impressive exercise of rational 
thought in an article directed primarily toward the practical implications 
of the theory of distributive justice advocated is necessarily superficial and 
possibly misleading. The intent is simply to outline Rawls’s main contri­
butions to distributive theories and at the same time to focus on the areas 
of his work which may be debatable. An analysis of some of the possible 
weaknesses should allow at least a superficial comparison of Rawls’s 
principles with more familiar theories and facilitate a better understand­
ing of his work. The analysis is undertaken in the expectancy that the 
serious reader will be sufficiently intrigued to read Rawls’s work in the 
following well-stated spirit of constructive criticism:
Legal philosophy is not a bad play in which each actor clears the 
stage by killing off his predecessors. Rather is legal philosophy, like 
philosophy generally, a great cooperative exploration of possible per­
spectives (Weltanschauungen) through whitih life’s many-faceted prob­
lems can be viewed. Progress in legal philosophy does not depend upon 
rejection of the insights that came to Plato and Aristotle, any more 
than progress in poetry depends upon rejection of Homer, or progress 
in music upon contempt for Bach or Beethoven. Nor is it necessary to 
assume, in the fashion popularized by Hegel and Pound, that every 
.‘school’ (perish the thought) of jurisprudence supersedes its prede­
cessors. The history of legal philosophy is not, as some of Pound’s writ­
ings have suggested, a sad history of successive errors, each thesis pro­
ducing, in Hegelian-Mandan fashion, its own antithesis and destruc­
tion, until, by a series of stages, we come to the ultimate product of the 
juristic mind, sociological jurisprudence, after which anything different 
must be considered as one of time’s typographical errors.18
II. R a w l s ’s  A p p r o a c h  t o  D is t r ib u t iv e  J u s t ic e
A . Methodology
Rawls attempts to achieve his principles of justice through a rational 
process, beginning with several assumptions which he believes are neces­
11 "My aim is to present a  conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a
higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in 
Locke, Rousseau, and K an t” Id. a t 11.
13 Cohen, supra note 10.
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sary to the derivation of just and fair principles. He assumes, for example, 
that the parties contracting for the principle of justice are dealing in a 
purely hypothetical situation called the “original position.”19 The parties 
in the original position are assumed to be rational individuals20 who will 
use whatever information is available to them in a rational manner.
To eliminate natural bias so that the parties may derive just principles, 
Rawls imposes certain limitations on the information available to the 
parties by means of a “veil of ignorance.”21 It should be noted that 
Rawls’s choice of information excluded by the veil is such that the parties 
will assuredly reach the results he believes in. For example, the parties 
have no knowledge of their position in society, their fortune in the distri­
bution of natural assets, such as intelligence and strength, their concep­
tion of good, or their psychological propensities.22 Rawls argues that
[t]his ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice 
of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of 
social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able 
to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of 
justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.23
To allow the parties in the original position to make some kind of 
choice, they are allowed to
know the general facts about human society. They understand political 
affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of 
social organization and the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the 
parties are presumed to know whatever general facts affect the choice 
of the principles of justice. There are no limitations on general infor­
mation, that is, on general laws and theories, since conceptions of justice 
must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social coopera­
tion which they are to regulate., and there is no reason to rule out these 
facts24
Rawls also assumes that the parties are incapable of envy25 and that they 
have no mutual interest in each other.26 The final major assumption is
19 m h e  original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the 
traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is not* of 
course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primi­
tive condition of culture. I t  is understood as a  purely hypothetical situation 
characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.
J .  R a w l s , supra n o te  1, a t  12; see id. a t  11, 18, fo r fu r th e r  e laboration .
20 “I have assumed throughout that the persons in the original position are rational.” 
Id. at 142.
21 See id. at 12, 18-19, for a  discussion of the concept of the veil of ignorance.
22 Id. a t 12. For other formulations of the veil of ignorance, see id. at 18, 136—42,
172, 200.
23 Id. a t 12.
24 Id. a t  137-38 .
25 ‘‘The special assumption I make is that a rational individual does not suffer from 
envy. He is not ready to accept a loss for himself if only others have less as well.” Id. 
at 143. Rawls argues that envy tends to make everyone worse off and therefore it would 
not be rational for men seeking to further their own interests to have feelings of envy. 
Id. at 144.
23 The assumption of mutually disinterested rationality, then, comes to this: the 
persons in the original position try to acknowledge principles which advance
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that there are some “primary goods/’27 including wealth, liberty, and 
power, which rational men would certainly desire.
Before the results of the hypothetical bargaining process of the parties 
in the original position are considered, it is necessary to discuss the im­
plications of the original position, the surrounding assumptions, and the 
methodology adopted by Rawls.
Rawls assumes that there are widely held principles common to a 
majority of people. Without questioning the validity of these principles, 
Rawls proceeds to operate upon them through a  rational process which 
leads to development of more principles and philosophical arrangements. 
These, of necessity, must support the original principles, and possible in­
consistencies are eliminated by a reformulation and refinement of the 
original principles. The process continues until the principles and rules 
derived from them achieve complete formal consistency. This process of 
feedback and refinement has the advantage of incorporating our most 
strongly held moral beliefs into a harmonic philosophical system in which 
they are given logical support. Rawls calls this process, similar to the 
“coherence theory3528 of truth, “reflective equilibrium.3529
Although this process has the advantage of reinforcing and stabilizing 
the beliefs of a certain time period and may have an effect on future 
beliefs, it cannot claim to have reached independent truths because of the 
unproven nature of the fundamental premises. This is not a particularly 
strong criticism, however, because alternative theories do not have inde­
pendently proven hypotheses either. An analysis of the assumptions made 
in Rawls3s work illustrates how reflective equilibrium shapes the princi­
ples. For example, the veil of ignorance keeps the parties from a  knowl­
their system of ends as far as possible. They do this by attempting to win for 
themselves the highest index of primary social goods, since this enables them to 
promote their conception of the good most effectively whatever it turns out 
♦to be. The parties do not seek to confer benefits or to impose injuries on one 
another; they are not moved by affection or rancor.
Id. at 144. The assumptions that the parties would not be moved by either envy or 
mutual interest probably result from Rawls’s desire to avoid making characterizations 
of human nature which could not be proven and would lead to much criticism.
27 As a  first step, suppose that the basic structure of society distributes certain 
primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to want. 
These goods normally have a use whatever a  person’s rational plan; of life.
For simplicity, assume that the chief primary goods a t the disposition of society 
are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth.
Id. at 62. Rawls also considers self-respect a  primary good. Id.
23 See Felnberg, Justice, Fairness, and Rationality, 81 Y a l e  L.J. 1004, 1018-19
(1972), for a  detailed analysis of Rawls’s methodology and the coherence theory.
23 When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing account of his sense 
of justice (one, say, which embodies various reasonable and natural presump­
tions) , he may well revise his judgments to conform to its principles even, 
though the theory does not fit his existing judgments exactly. He is especial­
ly likely to do this if he can find an explanation for the deviations which 
'undermine his confidence in his original judgments and if the conception, 
presented yields a  judgment which he finds he can now accept. From the 
standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a  person’s sense of justice 
is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception 
of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equi­
librium.
J .  R a w l s , supra note 1, at 48.
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edge of their particular social position.80 This assumption ensures that 
the principles of justice will not embody the concept of meritocracy.31 
Thus, Rawls’s primary assumptions and the process and content of the 
parties’ bargaining in the original position are subject to the traditional 
objection that the validity of the consequences are not verifiable.
Rawls seeks to make his principles of justice consistent with the western 
historical experience and fundamental cultural values that have evolved 
in many societies. If labeling is helpful, it is safe to classify Rawls’s theory 
as a right-based theory, in that the social system is fashioned primarily 
to accommodate the rights of individuals, in contrast to a duty-based 
(Kantian) or goal-based (utilitarian) theory. Rawls’s construction of a 
theory of justice, premised upon rational persons bargaining behind a 
veil of ignorance in a maimer similar to modem game theory,32 seeks to 
establish objective standards of justice to escape the utilitarian dilemma of 
possible subjection of individual liberty to a subjective standard of col­
lective utility. His theory, can also be classified as based on “want-regard­
ing” principles (as opposed to “ideal-regarding” principles) due to the 
assumption that rational men would try to create a system which would 
give them as many primary goods as possible.33
Rawls’s assumptions and methodology place his theory somewhere 
near the natural law theories of justice since he assumes that certain 
qualities — principally the ability to engage in a common rational process
— are inherent in every person and seeks to establish objective criteria
30 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
31 Rawls argues that meritocracy would only be eliminated in the case of a demo­
cratic interpretation of his two principles: “[A] meritocratic society is a danger for the 
other interpretations of the principles of justice but not for the democratic conception.” 
J. R a w l s , supra note 1, at 107. The argument is that the parties in the original posi­
tion, being under the veil of ignorance, would nesver agree to principles which would 
lead to a meritocratic society, since they would not want to create a  system where less 
talented people, perhaps themselves, would be disadvantaged. See M . Y o u ng , T h e  
R is e  o f  M eritocracy  (1958).
The fact that Rawls’s principles of justice would preclude a  meritocratic society 
is a substantial departure from many of the other theories of distributive justice and 
has brought about much of the criticism of Rawls. See Dworkin, The Original Position,
40 U. Ghi. L. R ev . 500 (1973). Dworkin essentially argues that fairness of the con­
tract made under the veil of ignorance does not necessarily constitute an independent 
argument for the fairness of its enforcement when the parties later actually know their 
talents and strengths. This argument assumes that a society which does not reward 
merit must necessarily be unfair, but such assumption is contrary to Rawls’s theory and 
does not contain an independent argument for its validity. Dworkin should have at­
tacked the veil of ignorance and not the fairness of the contract. Dworkin in fact states: 
The fact, therefore, that a particular choice is in my interest at a  particular 
time, under conditions of great uncertainty, is not a good argument for the 
fairness of enforcing that choice against one later under conditions of much 
greater knowledge.
Id. at 503.
83 In game theory, parties with competing interests try to maximize the outcome of 
their choice in view of the fact that they know the alternatives available to the other 
competing players. They are therefore forced to make decisions which will maximize 
their minimum outcome. Each player will try to improve his position while trying to 
put the other players in the worst position. The theory has been developed both for 
deterministic and, to some extent, probabilistic games. See A. R a po po r t , T w o -P e r so n  
G a m e  T h e o r y  (1966); A. R a po po r t* N -P er so n  G am e  T h e o r y  (1970).
33 B. Barry , T h e  L iberIal T h e o r y  o f  J u s t ic e  19-33 (1973) (detailed analysis 
of the implications of Rawls’s assumption about primary goods)..
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for a standard of justice. The word natural has unpleasant metaphysical 
associations for some, and others think that natural rights are “spectral 
attributes worn by primitive men like amulets, which* they carry into 
civilization to ward off tyranny.”34 It would be a mistake, however, to 
think that the original position and the principles derived from it are 
simply part of a hypothetical game, an irrational appeal to emotion, or a 
romantic appeal to man in the “natural” state before “original sin.” Rawls 
seems to assume that inherent both in our capacity to reason about moral­
ity and in the psychological processes of decision making is a common 
though process which dictates the establishment of a right-based theory 
of justice.33
B. The Tw o Principles of Justice 
Rawls postulates that the parties in the original position would choose 
two principles which, after a  process of refinement through' their use, 
would read as follows:
First Principle:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system 
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for 
all36
Second Principle:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both:
(■a) to the greatest benefit of the least 'advantaged, consistent with 
the just savings principle,37 and
(b) attached to offices and positions open “to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity.38
THe application of these two principles is regulated by a priority rule:
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore 
liberty can be restricted only for the sake of ’liberty.39
34 Dworkin:, supra note 31, a t 527.
55 “I t seems fair to assume. . .  that th e . . .  theory behind the original position must 
be a right-based theory of some sort.” Id.
23 J. R a w l s , supra note 1, at 250, 302. This final formulation of the first principle 
represents a refinement of the first formulation which reads:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Id. at 60.
37 The just savings principle deals with the distribution of wealth among generations. 
See note 64 infra.
53 J. R a w l s ,  supra note 1, at 302. The original formulation of the second principle 
reads:
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage* and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all.
Id. a t -60.
83 Id. a t 250. The "serial” or “lexical” order 
is an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before 
we can move on to the second, the second before we can consider the third, 
and so on. A principle does not come into play until those previous to it are
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The priority rule expresses the concept that the second principle of justice 
cannot be applied until the first principle is satisfied; that is, economic 
rearrangements cannot occur if they would lead to a restriction of basic 
liberties.40 The priority of liberty in Rawls’s work has been the subject 
of much analysis and criticism.41 Most commentators seem to agree that 
the basic problems with' the priority rule are that not all basic liberties 
are on the same level, that some may not require as much protection as 
others, and that it may at times be necessary to limit some liberties for the 
sake of economic benefits to society in general42 The priority rule is 
nevertheless quite defensible because it maintains individual liberty and, 
in reality, it is difficult to envision probable counterexamples where seri­
ous limitations of basic liberties would be necessary to achieve much 
greater economic benefit to society.
Since this article is concerned primarily with principles of distributive 
justice, the implications of the first principle will be analyzed only to the 
extent that they affect the distribution of wealth.
L  The First Principle — Rawls defines the “basic liberties” as being, 
roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible 
for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty 
of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along
either fully met or do not apply. A serial ordering avoids, then, having to 
'balance principles at all; those earlier in  the ordering have an absolute weight, 
so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception.
Id. at 43.
40 These principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle 
prior to the second. This ordering means that a departure from the institu­
tions of equal liberty* required by the first principle cannot be justified by,^  or 
compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages. The distribution 
of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of authority, must be consistent 
with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity.
Id. at 61.
41 See B. Barry, supra note 33, at ch. 4. In his detailed analysis Barry says: 
Rawls gives little usable guidance about the way to aggregate the different 
liberties so as to arrive at an estimate of the total amount of liberty generated 
by alternative combinations of these different liberties. . . .
Id. at 34. Barry does not agree with the rigidity of the priority principle and feels 
that rational men would not bind themselves to such a strict rule without leaving some 
leeway for adjustment of conflicting demands. See id. at 39. Also, see Feinberg, supra 
note 28, at 1028—30. Feinberg does not agree with the priority rule because he feels 
that there are certain cases where it would be more unjust to follow the priority rule 
than to disregard it.
Is  it necessarily unjust for example, for a government in certain circumstances 
to concentrate on elimination of extreme economic inequalities between the 
rich and the starving even at the cost of a modest or temporary suspension of 
some of the lesser basic liberties? . . .  No doubt middle class refugees from the 
tyrannies of Mao and Castro feel that they have been treated not only harsh­
ly but unfairly, and Rawls’ theory gives them solid support. But apologists 
for Mao and Castro sometimes reply that it would have been unfair. . .  to 
the starving and backward masses. ..  not to have expropriated the middle 
'class and put it [(the capital)] to work.
Id. at 1029. Of course a situation like Batista’s Cuba would not occur in a Rawlsian 
system and therefore the transitional problem with which Feinberg is concerned may 
fairly be said not to be covered by Rawls’s theory.
For further analysis and criticism of the priority rule, see Brock, The Theory of 
Justice, 40 U . C h i . L. R ev. 486, 491, 493 (1973); Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its 
Priority, 40 U . C h i . L. R ev . 534, 551-55 (1973).
42 See authorities cited note 41 supra.
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with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of t!he rule of law.43
If an assumption of the primacy of individual rights is the basis for 
constructing a model of justice by which to measure the justness of social 
institutions, the paradigm requires a set of defined individual rights which 
may not be infringed in the name of greater social and economic advan­
tage. Except for the priority rule and the extent to which Rawls recog­
nizes property ownership as a fundamental right, the particular basic 
rights enumerated by Rawls are subject to metaphysical debate beyond the 
scope of this discussion.
Rawls initially limits the right to hold property to personal property.44 
The parties in the original position, however, not knowing their social 
position, would not necessarily agree to a principle which would allow 
private ownership of real property. Presumably, Rawls would allow 
ownership of personal property merely as a matter of assumed psycho­
logical imperatives, convenience, or practicality, but the same reason 
which would preclude the holding of real property should also prohibit 
ownership of personal property in the form of investments and eliminate 
all forms of inheritance or bequest. If inheritance were allowed, some 
people would be economically advantaged at birth! without granting any 
corresponding economic benefit to society at large. Rawls chooses not 
to carry the implications of the veil of ignorance to their logical conclu­
sion, however, and so allows heavily taxed inheritance.45
Although Rawls does not consider private ownership of real property 
in his first formulation of the two principles, in their implementation he 
allows not only ownership of the means of production but also private 
ownership of natural resources.46 Such ownership would seem wholly 
inconsistent with the original position, but Rawls neglects to explain how 
the original contract could be so modified.
2. The Second Principle —  The core of a just distributive system in 
Rawls’s conception is embodied in the second principle 47 This principle
43 J. R a w l s ,  supra n o te  1, a t  61.
4K See Hart, supra note 41, at 5 3 6 -4 2  for an in-depth analysis of the implication 
of Rawls’s assumptions about basic liberties.
45 While dealing with the distribution branch, of the government, note 101 infra 
and accompanying text, Rawls imposes inheritance taxes:
(The distribution branch] imposes a  number of inheritance and gift taxes, 
and sets restrictions on the rights of bequest The purpose of these levies and 
regulations is not to raise revenue (release resources to government) but 
gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent 
Concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and 
fair equality of opportunity.
J .  R a w l s , supra n o te  1, a t  277.
40 See id. a t  275.
41 The analysis of the second principle is more complex simply because it is difficult 
to understand fully its implications and the manner in which the principle is affected 
by the assumptions made in the original position. In  his analysis of the second prin­
ciple, Rawls compares its implications with classical (id. a t § 3 0 ) and average (id. at 
§§ 2 7 -2 8 ) utilitarianism and intuitionism (id. a t  § 7 ) ,  all of which he criticizes as 
being unjust or inefficient.
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regulates the practical aspects of the institutional devices for determining 
the distribution of social and economic inequalities. Distribution decisions 
are to be made not through an application of the principle to specific 
cases but through a legislative process and institutions created in con­
formity with the two principles. In this way, Rawls argues, the resulting 
distribution will be just since it is determined by justly structured insti­
tutions. Rawls assumes that the second principle will be carried out by 
adopting a free market economy.48
Rawls’s provisional formulation of the second principle is followed by 
an analysis of its operation, which results in a refinement of the principle. 
The first formulation reads:
[S]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b)
attached to positions and offices open to all.49
Before exploring the operation of the second principle, Rawls intro­
duces the principle of efficiency.50 This principle indicates that, given a 
certain set of constraints, that is, goods to be distributed, a distribution 
among a fixed number of individuals is efficient if a change in the distri­
bution in order to put one or more individuals in a better position would 
put at least one other individual in a worse position. Obviously, once 
goods are distributed and individuals are no longer willing to trade goods 
they have received for goods held by others, the distribution is efficient.61 
Rawls realizes that the principle of efficiency cannot give any indication 
whether the resulting distribution is just or not,52 but tries to prove that
48 “I assume in all interpretations that the first principle of equal liberty is satisfied 
and that the economy is roughly a free market system, although the means of produc­
tion may or may not be privately owned.” Id. at 66.
49 Id. at 60.
60 Id. at 67—75. The principle of efficiency adopted by Rawls is essentially Pareto’s 
Optimality Principle. See A. P age, U t il it y  T h e o r y  38 (1968), for a  translation of 
Pareto’s relevant passages.
61 It should be noted that this formulation of the principle of efficiency is not ex­
tremely valuable; in fact, it only provides direotives in an expanding economy. To 
explain its limitations, restrict the class of goods distributed to money and assume that 
the individuals would rather have more than less money. Any distribution of the 
available money, whatever it may be, is automatically efficient. In fact, each individual 
would be less satisfied with another arrangement where he would receive less money, 
and to improve one individual’s position (give him more money), it would be necessary 
to deprive at least one other individual of some of the money he has received. The 
new distribution would therefore be less efficient than the previous one. Although any 
such distribution would be efficient in satisfying individual greed, nothing can be said 
about its efficiency in an economic or social sense. Distributions which may be efficient 
from the viewpoint of individual satisfaction may be very inefficient in terms of the 
well being of society at large.
The principle of efficiency assumes much greater significance when it is applied to 
the configuration of production systems. “The organization of production is efficient 
if there is no way to alter inputs so as to produce more of some commodity without 
producing less of another.” J. R a w l s , supra note 1, at 67. It is possible, given a cer­
tain amount of input commodities, to increase one or more output commodities with 
a more efficient configuration without violating the principle of efficiency.
68 There are, I shall assume, many efficient arrangements of the basic structure.
Each of these specifies a particular division of advantages from social coopera­
tion. The problem is to choose between them, to find a  conception of justice 
.that singles out one of these efficient distributions as also just.
Id. at 70-71.
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an application of the second principle will lead to a  distribution that is 
both efficient and just. Noting “that the principle of efficiency cannot 
serve alone as a conception of justice,”53 Rawls considers systems in which 
the operation of the principle of efficiency would produce a  just distribu­
tion. After rejecting systems of natural liberty, natural aristocracy, and 
a liberal interpretation of the principle of efficiency,54 Rawls adopts a 
democratic interpretation of the second principle and introduces the 
“difference principle.”56
The democratic interpretation. . .  is arrived at by combining the princi­
ple of fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle. This 
[latter] principle removes the indeterminateness of the principle of effi­
ciency by singling out a particular position from which the social and
economic inequalities of the basic structure are to be judged---- [T]he
higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they 
work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least"- 
advantaged members of society.56
Rawls explains the difference principle by reference to an individual rep­
resenting the lowest economic class, the least advantaged man,57 and one 
representing the uppermost class, the most favored man.58 The differ­
ence principle requires, given a certain stock of social primary goods to 
be distributed, that any increase in the quantity of primary goods dis­
tributed to the most favored man also increase the benefits and advantages 
to the least advantaged man. Rawls realizes that primary goods cannot 
be easily measured since some, such as self-respect, cannot be measured 
quantitatively, but considers the difference principle to be efficient even 
though’ he is not dealing with a classically constrained function.59 Since 
measurable primary goods, such as wealth, interact with nonmeasurable 
ones, such as power and self-respect, a change in the distribution of 
wealth, for example, could also change the total amount of self-respect or
a Id. a t 71.
M Rawls first considers a  system where the only concern is efficiency (i.e., one indi­
vidual with alt of the goods, the rest with none), but rightly concludes that such an 
arrangement would not be just. Id. a t  71. Rawls then considers a  system of “natural 
liberty’5 in which distribution is regulated by natural talents, but rejects it because “the 
most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive 
shares to be improperly influenced by these factors [natural talents and social position] 
so arbitrary from a  moral point of view.” Id. at 72. The third method of distribution 
Rawls considers is one based on what he calls the “liberal interpretation.” Id. a t 73. 
In  this system the distribution is based on talents but is qualified by the assumption 
that everyone has an equal opportunity to develop his talents regardless of social 
position. This system is rejected because “it still permits the distribution of wealth and 
income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents.” Id. a t 
73-74. After rejecting a system of “natural aristocracy” (id. a t 74-75), Rawls con­
cludes that a “democratic interpretation is the best choice.” Id. at 75.
13 For Rawfe’s interpretation of the difference principle, see id. a t 76-80.
10 Id. at 75.
a See id. at 78.
53 See id. at 76.
raIn defining the principle of efficiency (see notes 50,. 51 supra and accompanying 
text)', it is assumed that there exists a finite and known quantity of goods (the quantity 
and types of goods represent the constraints of the distribution function) to be dis­
tributed. Id. a t 67.
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power, thus affecting the constraints. This was not the case in the classi­
cal definition of the principle of efficiency; in the classical definition, dif­
ferent distributions of goods does not per se generate additional goods.
One of the unsolved problems with respect to the difference principle 
is who is to make the judgment as to when increases in the distribution 
of goods to the most favored man may result in a decrease in the benefits 
to the least advantaged man. If the least advantaged man is to be the 
decision maker, probably no increase in the distribution to the most 
favored man would be allowed since, for example, an increase in "wealth 
might not compensate for the least advantaged man’s loss of self-esteem. 
On the other hand, if the decision maker is an independent entity and the 
distribution is considered efficient when it increases the benefits to society 
as a whole, the least advantaged man may consider the resulting distri­
bution unsatisfactory although the independent decision maker considers 
it beneficial. If the decision maker were the least advantaged man, there­
fore, the resulting efficient distribution would not likely be an economical­
ly efficient distribution.
A second problem with the difference principle is that it seems to 
operate in a vacuum. In a real situation, it is hard to imagine an in­
crease in the distribution of goods either to the most favored or to the 
least advantaged man without either increasing the amount of resources 
available or redistributing the presently available ones. Since any redistri­
bution of presently available resources would almost certainly violate the 
principle of efficiency,60 new resources would have to be made available. 
But these new resources could be made available and distributed in such 
a way as to favor the upper classes greatly and the lower classes only 
marginally. This distribution would be “to everyone’s advantage,” but 
would not satisfy any intuitive sense of justice. Thus, the provisional 
formulation of the second principle could be satisfied by very unjust dis­
tributions. Moreover, an increase in the distribution of goods could result 
in an advantage to all of the presently existing representative classes but 
might not satisfy the principle of efficiency with respect to the distribution 
of goods among generations.
Rawls is aware of these limitations and is also aware that the difference 
principle cannot be applied to satisfy the principle of efficiency if one is 
operating on an unjust distribution. He responds to the problem by 
stating that
if the basic structure is unjust, these principles will authorize changes 
that may lower the expectations of some of those better off; and there­
fore the democratic conception is not consistent with the principle of 
efficiency if this principle is taken to mean that only changes which 
improve everyone’s prospects are allowed. Justice is prior to efficiency 
and requires some changes that are not efficient in this sense. Consis­
60 With a fixed amount of resources, giving more to some individuals would decrease 
the amount formerly possessed by other individuals. This would violate the principle 
of efficiency (with fixed constraints) since some people would have less than they had 
before. See text accompanying notes 50, 51 supra.
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tency obtains only in the sense that a perfectly just scheme is also 
efficient.61
The second principle does not suggest how to transform an unjust 
distributive system into a just one. Its application to ongoing systems is 
therefore problematic, and a redistribution in any existing society might 
have to be carried out on an empirical basis. Some independent princi­
ple, not yet conceptualized by Rawls, would be required as the basis for 
the achievement of the initial just distribution.
The fact that the second principle operates only on already just sys­
tems is not fatal to the theory. If the social contract theory and the con­
cept of the original position are accepted, it is apparent that the bargain­
ing parties would be primarily concerned with deriving principles of justice 
for the regulation of a just system rather than for the correction of an 
unjust system. The parties in the original position would not necessarily 
know what kind of unjust systems already exist.
(a ) Second Formulation of the Second Principle — To avoid the 
injustices which would result through the application of the provisional 
formulation of the second principle, Rawls reformulates the principle:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so th'at they are 
both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged^ consistent with 
the just savings principle^ and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity.62
This second formulation recognizes that for a change in distribution to be 
just it must not only improve the expectations of the least advantaged 
man, but must also maximize such expectations. This recognition derives 
from the fact that, according to Rawls, lacking other considerations, 
preference should be given to an egalitarian system. As Rawls states:
All social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, 
and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of 
the least favored.63
The problem of justice between generations present in the fhst formula­
tion of the second principle is mitigated by the introduction of the just 
saving rate 64 The parties in the original position, having no knowledge
61 J. R a w l s , supra n o te  1, a t  7 9 -80 .
61 Id. at 32. I t  should be noted that this formulation of the second principle does 
not satisfy the principle of efficiency since it does not require that each distribution 
be to everyone’s advantage. Rawls does not pursue this problem.
63 Id. a t  303.
64 The savings principle represents an interpretation arrived a t in the original 
position, of the previously accepted natural duty to uphold and to further just 
institutions. In this case the ethical problem is that of agreeing on a  path 
over time which treats all generations justly during the whole course of a
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of what generation they belong to, would try to determine a saving (or 
consumption rate of capital and natural resources that is just for all gen­
erations. Rawls assumes that “[t]he end of the savings process is set up in 
advance, although only the general outlines can be discerned. Particular 
circumstances as they arise will in time determine the more detailed as­
pects.3565 It has been argued that a maximization of the expectations of the 
least advantaged class would mean reduced investments and no just saving 
for future generations,06 but this criticism appears unfounded because, ac­
cording to the principle, such maximization cannot occur unless the just 
saving principle is satisfied.
The requirement that social and economic inequalities be arranged so 
that they will be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged class and 
satisfy the just savings principle is very restrictive and in practice would 
allow only small deviations from a principle of equality. Perhaps the 
major obstacle in the application of the second principle is deciding what 
goods to take into consideration in the search for this maximum. Con­
sidering the distribution of tangible goods only, it is apparent that a maxi­
mization of the expectations of the least advantaged class can lead to a 
significant degree of economic disparity. In this case, however, it would 
be easy to show that a much larger share may have to go to the upper 
classes in order for the lower classes to maximize their economic expecta­
tions. If, on the other hand, a distribution of all primary goods is con­
sidered, the application of the second principle becomes practically un­
manageable. The maximization of the benefits derived by the distribu­
tion of the primary goods to the least advantaged class cannot be easily 
measured. How does one maximize such intangibles as self-respect or 
power? Maximization of such things is as problematic as the maximiza­
tion of the average utility in the utilitarian doctrine. But in spite of the 
difficulties, it seems to be a prerequisite to achieving justice to maximize 
the expectations with respect to the distribution of all primary goods. 
Consideration of the distribution of three primary goods, income, wealth, 
and self-respect, illustrates this point. If only the first two were dis­
tributed, the optimal distribution would be the one that produces the 
greatest income and wealth for the least advantaged class. This may re­
quire that wealth be concentrated in a few hands in order to allow entre­
preneurial activities which would be beneficial to the lower classes in the 
form of income. But if self-respect is also considered, the distribution may 
be quite different. The least advantaged man may gain considerably 
more self-respect by knowing that his wealth is comparable to that of 
others than by having a greater income and being surrounded by people
society’s history. W h a t seems fa ir  to  persons in  th e  orig inal position  defines 
ju s tice  in  this instance as in  others.
Id. a t  289.
“ Id.
66 “ [M jaxim ization  of th e  incom e o f th e  w orst-off section of th e  po p u la tio n  m ig h t 
en ta il spend ing  n o th in g  o n  investm ent, a n d  th is w ou ld  m ake th e  n ex t genera tion  w orse 
off th a n  th e  c u rre n t one.” B. B a r ry ,  supra n o te  33, a t  43.
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who are wealthier than he is. If the self-respect of the least advantaged 
group decreases as the economic gap between classes increases, the optimal 
distribution would tend to be egalitarian. The same arguments would 
apply to the distribution of power, so the central problem becomes a com­
parison of an increase in income with a decrease in self-respect or power.67 
Rawls solves this problem by assuming that self-respect is based primarily 
upon an equal availability of civil and political liberties.68 This would 
alleviate the problem of the application of the second principle, but such 
a restrictive conception of self-respect seems too limited unless it is effec­
tively translated into meaningful political power which eventually brings 
about just reform of distributive institutions.
To achieve an optimal distribution of goods, Rawls tries to optimize 
not the distribution of self-respect but the distribution of the bases of self­
respect, but this approach fails to overcome the problems of weighing 
self-respect. If a clear relationship between the bases and self-respect is 
established or assumed69 then the distribution of bases is equivalent to 
some proportional distribution of self-respect. If that relationship is not 
established, a distribution of the bases per se is not logically supportable. 
This difficulty must be met by the establishment of a clear and verifiable 
relationship between the bases and the resulting amount of self-respect 
and not by what goods one chooses to distribute. Rawls’s assumption that 
the relationship exists does not appear to be sufficiently justified.
The second principle deals not only with the proper distribution of 
goods, but requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged so 
that they are “attached to offices and positions open to all under condi­
tions of fair equality and opportunity.” Moreover, it is important to note 
that Rawls has a lexical order70 within the second principle, as well as a 
lexical order between the first and second principles of justice which dic­
tates that the principle of fair opportunity should be satisfied before the 
difference principle.71 Rawls rejects the view that some restrictions of
67 The problems inherent in Rawls’s approach are discussed by Barry:
•The equal distribution of self-respect is said to be provided for so long as civil 
and political liberties are equally available to all and so long as no one is 
'debarred from competing for offices and positions carrying advantages of 
wealth or power. . . .  For Rawls, the obstacles to the achievement of equality 
of self-respect lie entirely in legally-prescribed inequalities of civil and political 
rights. . . .  That equality of self-respect may be as much or more hindered by 
inequalities of wealth, or power themselves apparently does not occur to him.
Id. at 32.
65 Rawls assumes that
(t]he basis for self-esteem in a just society is not then one’s income share but 
the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties. And 
this distribution being equal, everyone has a  similar and secure status when 
‘they meet to conduct the common affairs of the wider society. No one is in­
clined to look beyond the constitutional affirmation of equality for further 
political ways of securing his status.
J .  R a w l s , supra note 1, a t 544.
°  See note 67 supra.
70 See note 39 supra.
n The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency 
and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is 
•prior to the difference principle. There are two cases:
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opportunity are beneficial to society72 and, consistently with his central 
theme of rejecting maximization of utility as a worthwhile goal per se, 
views fair equality of opportunity as having value for its beneficial effect 
on the individual, independent of its efficiency.73
C. Implementation of the Two Principles 
The two principles and the priority rules are not devices for decision 
on a case by case basis; instead, they are to guide the formulation of a 
just constitution and just political and economic structures. Rawls divides 
the process of designing a global political and economic system into four 
stages.74
L  The Stages of Implementation — The first stage is referred to as the 
constitutional convention.75 In this stage there is a partial lifting of the 
veil of ignorance and although the participants still
do not know their own social position, their place in the distribution 
of natural attributes, or their conception of the good. . . .  [T]hey now
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those 
with the lesser opportunity;
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of 
those bearing this hardship.
J. R a w l s , supra note 1, at 302-03.
73 Burke believed that the great families of the ruling stratum contribute by the 
wisdom of their political rule to the general welfare from generation to 
generation. Hegal thought that restrictions of equality of opportunity such 
as primogeniture, are essential to insure a  landed class especially suited to 
political rule in virtue of its independence from the state, the quest for profit, 
and the manifold contingencies of civil society. Privileged family and property 
arrangements prepare those favored by them to take a clearer view of the 
universal interest for the benefit of the whole society.
Id. at 300.
731 should note that the reasons for requiring open positions are not solely, or 
even primarily, those of efficiency. I have not maintained that offices must be 
open if in fact everyone is to benefit from [such] an arrangement. For it may 
be possible to improve everyone’s situation by assigning certain powers and 
benefits to positions despite the fact that certain groups are excluded from 
them. Although access is restricted, perhaps these offices can still attract 
superior talent and encourage better performance. But the principle of open 
positions forbids this. It expresses the conviction that if some places were not 
open on a basis fair to all, those kept out would be right in feeling unjustly 
treated even though they benefited from the greater efforts of those who were 
allowed to hold them. They would be justified in their complaint not only 
because they were excluded from certain external rewards of office such as 
wealth and privilege, but because they were debarred from experiencing the 
realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social 
duties. They would be deprived of one of the main forms of human good.
Id. a t 84.
74 [I]f several intermediate stages are imagined to take place in a definite se­
quence, this sequence may give us a  schema for sorting out the complications 
that must be faced. Each stage is to represent an appropriate point of view 
from which certain kinds of questions are considered. Thus I suppose that 
after the parties have adopted the principles of justice in the original position, 
ithey move to a  constitutional convention. Here they are to decide upon the 
justice of political forms and choose a constitution: they are delegates, so to 
speak, to such a convention. Subject to the constraints of the principles of 
justice already chosen, they are to design a system for the constitutional powers 
of government and the basic rights of citizens.
Id. at 196-97.
75 Id. at 196.
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know  the  relevant general facts abou t th e ir  society, th a t  is, its natu ra l 
circum stances an d  resources, its level of economic advance and  political 
culture, and  so on.76
The reason for not lifting the veil of ignorance as to the social position of 
the parties is that the parties, assumed to be rational beings who seek 
their own self-interest, would incorporate into the constitution provisions 
which would favor their own condition. It is not as clear why the dele­
gates to the constitutional convention would need information about their 
society’s economic advance and political culture. If both the first and 
second principle and the priority rule have to be satisfied at any level of 
economic development, knowledge about the economic advance would 
not seem relevant to drafting a constitution. The constitution, presum­
ably meant to incorporate more detailed principles which satisfy the two 
principles of justice, should not contain statutory provisions which are 
dependent on the society’s economic level. Otherwise the constitution 
would be subject to change as the society’s economy develops. The only 
possible justification for such economic knowledge would exist if the 
country has operated with a private or public economy; the delegates, 
having knowledge of the past performance, might wish to incorporate into 
the constitution one form or the other. Rawls considers a  just constitution 
to be “the constitution that satisfies the principles of justice and is best cal­
culated to lead to just and effective legislation.5’77 
The second stage is legislative in nature. Rawls assumes that the repre­
sentatives, who still have no knowedge about themselves,78 would legislate 
by using the device of “reflective equilibrium.”79 “Statutes must satisfy 
not only the principles of justice but whatever limits are laid down in the 
constitution. By moving back and forth between the stages of the consti­
tutional convention and the legislature, the best constitution is found.”80 
During the third stage, a stage of actual legislation, the veil of ignorance 
is totally lifted.81 While the first principle served as the primary standard 
for the delegates to the constitutional convention,
[t]he second principle comes into play at the stage of the legislature.
I t  dictates th a t social an d  economic policies be aim ed a t maxim izing 
th e  long-term  expectations of th e  least advan taged  u n d er conditions
n Id. a t  197.
n Id. Rawls defines broadly what should be incorporated into a  just constitution: 
[T]he liberties of equal citizenship must be incorporated into and protected 
by the constitution. These liberties include those of liberty of conscience and 
freedom of thought, liberty of the person, and equal political rights. The 
political system, which I assume to be some form of constitutional democracy, 
would not be a just procedure if it did not embody these liberties.
Id. a t 197-98.
78 Proposed bills are judged from the position of a representative legislator who, as 
always, does not know the particulars about himself. Id. at 198.
See notes 28, 29 supra and accompanying text
“  J. R a w l s ,  supra note 1, at 198.
w “At this point the full range of general economic and social facts is brought to 
bear.” Id . at 199.
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of fair equality of opportunity, subject to t!he equal liberties being main­
tained.82
The last stage is that of the application of rules to particular cases 
by judges and administrators^ and the following of rules by citizens 
generally. At this stage everyone has complete access to all of the 
facts.83
Rawls argues that the best implementation of the two principles of 
justice can be obtained through a democratic process,84 but his legislative 
process for the implementation of just laws differs substantially from the 
usual democratic process. Instead of reaching agreements through a 
process similar to the ideal free economic market regulated by competing 
forces, he argues that “[t]he legislative discussion must be conceived not as 
a contest between interests, but as an attempt to find the best policy as de­
fined by the principles of justice.5585 Thus, legislators are expected to rep­
resent the best interests of all citizens, as defined by the principles of 
justice, rather than the interests of a particular group or geographic area.
Rawls5s belief that the ideal legislative process, where the represen­
tatives try to fulfill the requirements of the principles of justice rather 
than pursuing their specific interests, is superior to the competitive political 
process is not surprising, but the critical issue is whether the legislators 
would operate in the ideal fashion. This ideal behavior, amounting to 
total objectivity even when the individual knows all of the facts regarding 
his position is in sharp contrast to the assumptions made in the original 
position that parties would pursue their own interests and must have no 
mutual interests. Although Rawls argues that his principles of justice 
would lead people to behave so as to insure stability to the system,86 it is 
hard to conceive how a desire to maintain stability would lead legislators 
to operate in a disinterested fashion, particularly when such behavior 
would require a complete reversal of the “mutual-disinterestedness” as­
sumption.87 In view of these difficulties, Rawls admits that “[t]here seems
82Id.
83 Id.
**Id. at 65, 75.
85 Id. at 357. Rawls expressly rejects the theory of a competitive legislative process. 
A free market system may lead to optimal solutions in the economic field, but in the 
legislative process the goal is justice and not efficiency. He says:
'So far at least there does not exist a theory of just constitutions as procedures 
leading to just legislation which corresponds to the theory of competitive mar­
kets as procedures resulting in efficiency. And this would seem to imply that 
the application of economic theory to the actual constitutional process has 
grave limitations insofar as political conduct is affected by men’s sense of 
justice, as it must be in any viable society, and just legislation is the primary 
social end.
Id. at 360-61.
86 [M]embers [of a society] have a strong and normally effective desire to act as 
the principles of justice require. Since a well-ordered society endures over 
time, its conception of justice is presumably stable: that is, when institutions 
are just (as defined by this conception), those taking part in these arrange­
ments acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part 
in maintaining them.
Id. a t 454.
87 See note 26 supra.
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to be no way to characterize a feasible procedure guaranteed to lead to 
just legislation.”88 Although it is not necessary to dwell on this particular 
aspect of the theory, it appears inevitable that if the ideal legislative 
process does not become a reality,89 the implementation of the second 
principle of justice would falter. The resulting social system might pro­
vide a great deal of liberty without the required distributive justice. The 
American experience of a legislative process which has evolved to repre­
sent vested economic interests and defined geographic constituencies may 
provide a good example of exactly those consequences.
2 . The Distribution Branches — One of the outcomes of the constitu­
tional convention and of the legislative process is the creation of a number 
of institutions, which, through a just procedural scheme, would determine 
the proper allocation and reallocation of resources so as to implement a 
just distributive system. The scheme Rawls suggests makes considerable 
use of market arrangements90 and assumes that there is or should be 
private ownership of capital and natural resources.91
As argued previously, the parties in the original position, under the 
particular veil of ignorance chosen by Rawls, would not necessarily choose 
a system allowing private ownership of real property, much less one al­
lowing private ownership of natural resources.92 This would defeat 
Rawls’s theory that people should not be penalized by their particular 
situation at birth'. Even though it can be argued that the maximization 
of the expectations of the lower classes required by the second formulation 
of the second principle would require such ownership, that solution would 
result in conditions and injustices that would not have been agreed upon 
in the original position.
Rawls divides government institutions dealing with distributive justice 
into four branches. The allocation branch93 would keep the market com­
petitive and impede accumulation of excessive power. The stabilization 
branch94 would strive to bring about full employment. The transfer
83 J. R a w l s , supra no te  1, a t  360.
® Rawls’s theory does not provide the support for such an outcome. The ideal 
legislative process is a desirable feature, but there is little reason to believe it  would 
become a reality in a Rawlsian society. The actual legislative process thus represents 
the weak link in the chain of implementation of the second principle. The problem 
of how to achieve just legislation through a  democratic process remains unsolved.
00 “I t  is only in this way, I  believe, that the problem- of distribution can be handled 
as a case of pure procedural justice.” J. R a w l s , supra note 1, a t 274.
01 “At the start I assume that the regime is a property-owning democracy. . . Id. 
at 274. Rawls also develops his scheme assuming private ownership of capital and 
natural resources. See id. a t 275.
03 See notes 44- 46 supra and accompanying text.
53 The allocation branch. . .  is to keep the price system workably competitive 
and to prevent the formation of unreasonable market power. . . .  The alloca­
tion branch is also charged with identifying and correcting, say by suitable 
taxes and subsidies and by changes in the definition of property rights, the 
inore obvious departures from efficiency caused by the failure of price to mea­
sure accurately social benefits and costs.
J. R a w l s ,  supra note 1, at 276.
01 “The stabilization branch. . .  strives to bring about reasonably full employment 
in the sense that those who want work can find it and the free choice of occupation 
and the deployment of finance is [sic] supported by strong effective demand.” Id.
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branch95 would set a social minimum for the distribution of primary goods. 
The distribution branch®6 would preserve justice in the distributive shares 
by taxation and controls on property.
Although Rawls has chosen a free market system for the implementa­
tion of his system of procedural justice, he claims that in theory the two 
principles of justice could also be implemented by a liberal socialist regime 
where
the means of production are publicly owned and . . .  firms are managed 
by workers5 councils say, or by agents appointed by them. Collective 
decisions made democratically under the constitution determine the 
general features of the economy, such as the rate of saving and the 
proportion of society’s production devoted to essential public goods.97
One curious aspect of Rawls’s approach is that he chooses a free market 
system and then proceeds to limit it so much that some of the features of 
a free market are lost.
Rawls favors a market system because he believes it is efficient98 and 
easier than other systems to manage.1"  He demonstrates awareness of the 
limitations of a market system, however, since he suggests that it must be 
controlled through the allocation branch and that the actual distribution 
of wealth must be arranged through the use of the transfer and distributive 
branches. Evidently, the market system is not an efficient vehicle for 
carrying out the requirements of the second principle, at least in terms 
of the narrow economic meaning attached to that concept. Moreover, 
Rawls only briefly hints at the problem that a market system may not be 
an efficient means, or even compatible with, preserving the environ­
ment.100 It seems inefficient to have the market system determine workers’ 
wages and to then have the transfer branch supplement their income, 
unless the definition of efficiency includes broader values than mere quali­
fied measures of economic efficiency. Nor does it seem logical to allow
95 “The essential idea is that the workings of this branch takes [sic] needs into ac­
count and assigns [sic] them an appropriate weight with respect to other claims. A 
competitive price system gives no consideration to needs and therefore it cannot be 
the sole device of distribution.” Id.
98 “Its task is to preserve an approximate justice in distributive shares by means of 
taxation and the necessary adjustments in the rights of property. . . .  [I]t imposes a 
number of inheritance and gift taxes, and sets restrictions on the rights of bequest” 
Id. at 277.
97 Id. at 280. For an example of the implementation of this approach in an ongoing 
business enterprise, see E. Sc h u m a c h e r , S m all  is  Be a u t ifu l  —  E co no m ics as if  
P e o p l e  M a ttered  256—75 (1 9 7 3 ).
98 Under certain conditions competitive prices select the goods to be produced 
and allocate resources to their production in such a  manner that there is no 
way to improve upon either the choice of productive methods by firms, or 
the distribution of goods that arises from the purchases of households.
J . R a w l s , supra no te  1, a t  271.
89 “All regimes will normally use the market to ration out the consumption goods 
actually produced. Any other procedure is administratively cumbersome. . . Id. 
at 270.
100 Rawls argues that both a private property and a socialist system may be unsuited 
to handle this problem properly. See id. at 271.
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the market system to create unnecessarily large accumulations of wealth 
which axe then eliminated by the distribution branch.
The free market also does not allow efficient systems of production in 
areas where the demand for certain goods is below the optimal production 
size of one fiim and competition would be detrimental to efficiency. In  
this situation, prices, entry, and allocation of resources would have to be 
controlled. This is but one example of how a pure market system, con­
strained only by resources supply and kept free by antitrust actions, is not 
efficient in the narrow economic sense.
The second principle requires that deviations from equality be allowed 
only when they are necessary to maximize the well being of the least ad­
vantaged class. The market system needs an incentive (presumably fin an* 
cial) in order to operate, and even if there were a  distribution branch 
which eliminated excess wealth or gains, a certain level of disparity must 
exist in order to provide the necessary incentive. Thus, the market system 
mandates some distribution of wealth and a certain disparity between 
the least advantaged class and the most favored class.101 Whatever dis­
tribution system selected would be just only if it were impossible, by using 
an economic system other than the free market, to fashion another distri­
bution system which is both more egalitarian and puts the least advan­
taged class in a better position. To prove'that the free market system is 
the best alternative, Rawls would have to show that the level of incentive 
necessary to the operation of a free market represents the least possible 
differential from the lower class income of all the possible economic 
systems, and that the market system would, given the same resource allo­
cation, achieve the best alternative for the lowest class when compared to 
all other systems.
Rawls’s attempt to prove by default that a free market would lead to 
an optimal solution is unsatisfactory; but such proof is probably not with­
in the realm of present knowledge. Inherent in such proof is the require­
ment that the cultural evolution of a society’s view of the worth of the 
individual, the function of the state, the cultural values of a society, and 
the institutional structure for defining and distributing goods all be fac­
tored into a measurement of the society’s efficient use of the free market 
concept.102
Writing in the milieu of western political thought, Rawls is naturally 
influenced in his speculation about implementing the principles of justice 
by the political, economic, and social values of his society. Thus, Rawls’s 
general principle for distributive justice reflects the prevailing values of a 
culture dedicated to the fragmentation of political and economic power in
101 I t  is impossible to know a  priori what the distribution would be, but when the 
system is implemented one definite distribution will be obtained.
102 The effort to reduce economic analysis to a  science in its narrowest sense requires
the rejection of values incapable of quantification. Such a  process not only produces 
flimsy "scientific” evidence upon what to regulate or predict human activity, but also 
ignores and prevents rational reflection upon the hidden metaphysical assumptions of 
such an approach. See E. S c h u m a c h e r , supra note 97, a t 86-87.
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society, equality of opportunity, protection of some level of private prop­
erty ownership as an indispensable element of freedom, a written con­
stitution, and a fundamental commitment to a free market economy, the 
excesses of which are to be curbed by the police power. Rawls’s articula­
tion of a principle of distributive justice captures the unstated assumptions 
of a just society which have emerged in the American experience. More­
over, the implementation of Rawls’s theory would meet the crisis of a cul­
ture lacking a consistent or rational commitment to an ideal of distribu­
tive justice. Despite criticism of the theoretical implications of Rawls’s 
theory in the vacuum of the hypothetical situation in which he writes, the 
application of his theory to the reality of modem America could be 
achieved with a minimal disruption of existing institutions and in a man­
ner consistent with the cultural evolution of American social values. Thus, 
despite our differences with the theoretical arguments underlying the 
theory, we believe that Rawls has presented the best alternative for im­
plementing a new sense of justice in a manner consistent with the values of 
our society, compatible with political realities, and within the framework 
of most of our existing institutions.
I I I .  I n s t it u t io n a l  R e f o r m s  in  L ig h t  o f  R a w l s ’s 
T h e o r y  o f  D is t r ib u t iv e  J u s t ic e
Several basic institutions of American society are in need of reform if 
Rawls’s principles of distributive justice are to be given even minimal 
effect. Unless these background institutions incorporate just principles in 
their structure and operation, any resulting distribution will be unjust.103
A. Reform of the Political Process
Rawls emphasizes pure democracy as the essential ingredient for im­
plementing his principles of justice through the legislative process.104 
Ideally, legislators should vote according to their own judgment and “at­
tempt to find the best policy as defined by the principles of justice” with­
out pressure from contending interest groups.105 Rawls acknowledges 
that it may be impossible to guarantee this ideal,106 the same ideal that the 
draftsmen of the United States Constitution107 sought to achieve by frag­
menting and controlling government power through the separation of 
powers,108 establishing a bicameral legislature100 establishing a federal
103 is necessary to set the social and economic process within the surroundings 
of suitable political and legal institutions. Without the proper arrangement of these 
background institutions the outcome of the distributive process will not be just.” J. 
R a w l s , supra note 1, at 275.
1M See text accompanying notes 84—89 supra.
105 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
10S See text accompanying note 88 supra.
107 James Madison’s view of the nature of men was more pragmatic and cynical 
than Rawls’s. In  T h e  F e d e r a l is t  N o . 10, at 60 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison), 
Madison suggests that “the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is 
only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.” See id. No. 51, at 347—48.
108Id. No. 9, at 50-51 (A. Hamilton); id. Nos. 47, 48 (J. Madison).
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state,110 and adopting a written bill of rights as an integral part of the 
Constitution111 Rawls’s ideal legislative process and the Framers’ ideal 
of minimizing the ability of special interest groups to “unite and oppress 
the weaker'3112 have been undermined by the dependence of our elected 
representatives on excessive amounts of privately raised campaign funds. 
The vice of this impingement upon the ideal of pure democracy was well 
stated by Rawls:
Public resources have n o t been devoted to  m ain tain ing  th e  institutions 
required  fo r th e  fa ir  value o f political liberty. Essentially th e  fa u lt lies 
in  the  fa c t th a t th e  dem ocratic political process is a t  best regulated 
rivalry ; i t  does no t even in  theory  have th e  desirable properties th a t 
price theory ascribes to  tru ly  com petitive m arkets. Moreover,, the  
effects o f injustices in  th e  political process a re  m u ch  m ore grave and  
long lasting th a n  m arket imperfections. Political pow er rapidly  ac­
cum ulates an d  becomes unequal; an d  m aking use of th e  coercive appa­
ra tus of th e  sta te  an d  its law, those w ho  gain th e  advantage can  often 
assure themselves o f a  favored position. T h u s  inequities in  th e  economic 
an d  social system m ay soon underm ine w hatever political equality 
m ight have existed und er fo rtuna te  historical conditions. Universal 
suffrage is an  insufficient counterpoise; ’fo r w hen parties a n d  elections 
a re  financed n o t by public funds b u t by p rivate  contributions, th e  politi­
cal forum  is so constrained by th e  wishes of th e  dom inan t interests th a t 
th e  basic m easures needed to  establish ju s t constitutional ru le  a re  sel­
dom  seriously presented.113
Distortions of many government resources allocations and wealth trans­
fer decisions, made for special interest group gain at the expense of the 
least advantaged, are a direct product of the present state of campaign 
financing. The total expenditures in campaigns have jumped from $200 
million in 1964 to $400 million in 1972,114 with the bulk of the money 
coming from wealthy individuals, large corporations and unions, and 
other well-heeled centers of economic power. The result is not only Water­
gate, the IT T  and milk fund scandals, and soaring oil company profits, 
.but also the treatment of poor people or the young who descend upon 
Washington to lobby for their interests as a dangerous rabble undeserving 
of basic political liberties. On the other hand, vested interest lobbyists
103 I t  is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree
than to other governments, that those who administer it, may forget their
obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their constituents, 
and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In  this point of view, a senate,
as a  second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing
the power with, a  first, must be in all cases a  salutary check on the govern­
ment.
Id. No. 62, at 418 (J. Madison).
110 Id. No. 51, a t 352 (J. Madison).
lu  I .  B r a n e l t ,  T h e  B i l l  o f  R i g h t s  223 (1 9 6 5 ) .
113T h e  F ed er a list  No. 51, a t 352 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
113 J. R a w l s , supra n o te  1, a t  226.
ui Greene, Who Should Pay for Political Campaigns? > 12 C o l u m . J o u r n a l is m  
Rev. 24, 25 (Jan./Feb. 1974).
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have immediate access to all levels of government and are listened to with 
deference. As a result, quite often only one side of an issue is heard and 
affirmative action is all but impossible to achieve if the interests of a 
major source of campaign funds are being threatened. Until the depen­
dency of our present political system, particularly at the national level, on 
large sums of privately raised campaign funds is eliminated, the realiza­
tion of a new ethic of distributive justice will not be accomplished through 
the political process. The present economic basis of our political process 
makes the process itself unjust since it frustrates the liberty of each citizen 
to exercise basic political rights, denies equal access to all, and clearly 
prevents institutional reform and the intelligent maximization of social 
and economic equality through the law-making function.115
Reform legislation recently adopted by Congress failed to adequately 
remedy the fundamental defect of political rivalry fueled by private 
financing.116 Partial reform was made in presidential elections by provid­
ing matching public financing with private financing, broader disclosure 
requirements, and limitations upon campaign expenditures. But the fi­
nancing of congressional campaigns remains exclusively private. When 
coupled with the limitations upon campaign expenditures by both chal­
lengers and incumbents, the new legislation not only perpetuates the vice 
of private financing in legislative elections but also may be expected to 
provide incumbents with a decided advantage. Thus, the political forum 
will probably continue to be “constrained by the wishes of the dominant 
interests” seeking undue favor through the financing of political cam­
paigns.
jB. Distortions of Resource Allocation and Wealth Distribution Through 
the Tax System
The undermining of a just political system by tying entry and success 
to private financing has in turn undermined a second fundamental insti­
tution for maximizing distributive justice in society — a rational and fair 
tax and wealth transfer process. Rawls divides the function of taxation 
and allocation of revenues between different branches of government. The 
distribution branch is assigned the tasks of imposing taxes on inheritance 
to prevent an undue accumulation of wealth and creating a “scheme of 
taxation to raise the revenues that justice requires.”117 Expenditure of the 
revenue raised to assure the maintenance of “a certain level of well-being 
and [to honor] the claims of need”118 is assigned to the transfer branch, 
while the maintenance of a competitive market system and full employ­
ment are the duties of the allocation and stabilization branches.119 It may
115 See D. N ic h o l s ,  F in a n c in g  E l e c t i o n s  (1974).
118 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93—443, 88 
S tat 1263, amending 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-441, 451-454; 18 U.S.G.A. §§ 591, 600, 
608, 610, 611; 7 U.S.G.A. §§ 312, 315, 802-805. For an analysis of the legislation, 
see 32 C o n g . Q u a r t .  2865—70 (1974).
117 J. R a w l s ,  supra note 1, at 278.
318 Id. at 276.
119 Id.
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be unreasonable to expect a restructuring of current governmental institu­
tions to conform literally to Rawls’s proposed four branches of govern­
ment. Yet the failure to clearly separate those functions Rawls assigns to 
the distribution branch and those functions he assigns to the transfer 
branch has undermined the rational, fair, and just implementation of the 
tax system and distorted the rational allocation of resources and distribu­
tion of wealth'. Separation of some of these functions in the legislative 
process has generally taken place through the congressional committee 
process, although the distinction between taxation to raise revenue and 
deconcentrate wealth and the appropriation process has become blurred 
by the use of the progressive income tax system simultaneously to raise 
revenue, provide subsidies, and stimulate resource allocation decisions.
This confusion of objectives in enacting tax legislation has resulted in 
a progressive income tax system that is neither progressive nor a tax on 
income. Through! a combination of special interest lobbying, ad hoc and 
simple minded use of the tax power to allocate resources and expend 
revenue through exemptions,120 and a failure to assess the economic im­
pact of the whole tax structure, the system has become a regressive tax 
upon the wage income of the middle and lower classes and a tax reward 
to the wealthy and nonwage earners. It has been estimated that the tax 
system allocates 2.2 billion dollars annually to the rich in the form of 
loopholes which exempt from taxation the income of the wealthiest one- 
half of one percent of the families in this country. Overall tax subsidies, 
in the form of deductions, exclusions, depreciation methods, and other 
indirect devices amounting to subsidies aggregate to approximately sixty 
to sixty-five billion dollars per year, one-fourth of the regular federal 
budget121
Subsidies are buried in the Internal Revenue Code as exemptions, de­
ductions, or credits and are not weighed in the appropriation process for 
what they are: a type of government appropriation in the form of a  nega­
tive subsidy which provides an escape from or minimization of taxation 
with the direct effect of redistributing public wealth. For example, the 
oil depletion allowance is as much a government welfare program as 
government aid to dependent children; the deduction of interest paid for 
home mortgages from personal income taxes is as much a subsidy as 
direct foreign aid to Cambodia or Israel; the tax exemption for income 
realized from state and local bonds is as much a subsidy as direct federal 
grants to support the arts, child care centers, or the mentally ill; and 
provision for accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit for 
business is as much a subsidy as food stamps for the poor and unemploy­
ment compensation for those out of work.
Without passing on the merits or equity of any particular indirect 
subsidy by exclusion from taxation, it is clear that providing government 
support or wealth transfers through indirect tax subsidies has several ad­
1=0 See text accompanying note 123 infra.
121 S . S u r r e y , P a t h w a y s  t o  T a x  R e f o r m  7 (1973).
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verse effects. For one thing, the executive branch, Congress, and the 
public do not generally recognize such subsidies for what they really are, 
nor do they appreciate the true magnitude of the social and economic 
impact of such wealth transfer decisions. Moreover, indirect subsidies are 
often hidden governmental expenditures or hidden wealth transfers at 
best; at worst, they are crude devices for achieving a particular govern­
mental objective which become institutionalized beyond rational reform
— particularly by a political process undermined by private funding — 
after the original objective has been achieved.
Incidents of generally unknown distributive injustice occur because of 
the complexity and hidden subsidy objectives of the income tax laws. 
Many of the wealthiest citizens pay no income taxes at all, while the poor 
pay a much higher percentage of their income in the form of taxes of all 
kinds than do the middle and upper classes.122 The present tax structure 
has been converted into one of the major purveyors of distributive in­
justice in our society principally because exclusions and preferences from 
taxation have not been justified on the basis that they are reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage.123 Many exist for precisely the 
opposite reason. Thus, for example, wealth earned from human labor is 
taxed at a higher rate than wealth accumulated from capital gains, both 
at the time earned and upon transfer at death. While it may be too simple 
to suggest a dollar is a dollar however it was earned, most of the Byzan­
tine complexity of our tax system would be ended by abolishing the capital 
gains differential and by implementing any necessary incentive to invest 
risk capital through direct subsidy. The extent to which a tax differential 
could be justified should depend upon proof that the differential provides 
an incentive for entrepreneurs to invest risk capital for the long range 
benefits of all; that is, that the proverbial shower of benefits will trickle 
down to the lowest income earner because of the investment of capital in 
risky ventures. This theory does not correspond with reality since a very 
small share of corporate capital — less than two percent in the decade of 
the sixties124 — is derived from the stock market. If some kind of subsidy 
is needed to encourage risk taking, a direct subsidy is a more refined 
manner of achieving the goal. Moreover, the nexus between the capital 
gains incentive and the actual use of the exemption has become extremely 
tenuous, as a vast army of tax experts has labored to broaden the defini­
tion of capital gains income to include cattle breeding and resort develop­
ment room space sold as condominiums. The result is not only distributive 
injustice, but massive economic misallocations as investment decisions of 
excess capital are dictated by personal tax advantage rather than eco­
nomic efficiency and social justice.
122See P. St e r n , T h e  R ape  o f  t h e  T axpayer  5 -2 9  (1 9 7 3 ).
123 See J . R a w l s ,  supra no te  1, a t  278—84, fo r h is exam ination  of th e  tax  system.
124 See P. S t e r n ,  supra n o te  122, a t  117-18.
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Tax inequalities can be justified where they are of benefit to all,125 but 
the present structure and operation of the Internal Revenue Code is gross­
ly unjust under any theory of distributive justice. If lawyers and econo­
mists fail to reform the system in a manner consistent with principles of 
individual distributive justice, injustices will continue to be perpetuated 
and the efficiency of the system — largely dependent upon voluntary com­
pliance—  may sooner or later be subject to total destruction by massive 
noncompliance. Destruction of the voluntary tax system will mean the 
destruction of one of society’s best tools for rationally achieving distributive 
justice.
A first step in reforming the tax system should be a division of the 
process for enacting tax legislation into its revenue raising function and 
its appropriaton function so that the latter does not overwhelm the 
former. Until this step is taken, further reform of the tax system and the 
appropriation process will be frustrated, and Rawls’s ideal of a fair distri­
bution of the burden of taxation and transfer of collective wealth in a 
manner consistent with the “difference principle55126 will be beyond the 
reach of our system of government.
C. Institutional Structure of Large Corporations
A third area of crucially needed institutional reform central to a re- 
newela of distributive justice in America is the redefinition of the nature of 
giant corporations, many of which are essentially multi-national political 
states.127 Rawls does not directly examine the distributive justice impli­
cations of the institutional structure imposed by law on large corporations 
and the extent to which that structure deviates from the ideal of justice 
prescribed, or controls the evolution of other institutional devices of society 
for achieving distributive justice, or contributes to the maldistribution of 
wealth in society. However, Rawls5s reformulation of the second principle
125 R aw ls advocates a  "p ro p o rtio n a l expend itu re  tax*”  
since i t  im poses a  levy accord ing  to  how  m u ch  a  person  takes o u t of th e  com­
m o n  store  o f goods a n d  n o t acco rd ing  to  how  m u ch  h e  con tribu tes (assum ing 
h e re  th a t  incom e is fa irly  e a rn e d ) . A gain , a  p ro p o rtio n a l ta x  o n  to ta l con­
sum ption  (fo r each  y ea r say) can  co n ta in  th e  u su a l exem ptions fo r  depen­
d en ts , an d  so o n ; a n d  i t  trea ts  everyone in  a  un ifo rm  w ay  (s till assum ing  th a t  
incom e is fa irly  e a rn e d ) . I t  m ay  be  b e tte r, therefo re , to  use progressive rates 
only  w hen  th ey  a re  necessary to  p reserve th e  ju s tice  of th e  basic  s tru c tu re  w ith  
respec t to  th e  first p rinc ip le  o f ju s tice  a n d  fa ir  equa lity  o f o ppo rtun ity , a n d  
so to  forestall accum ulations o f p ro p e rty  a n d  pow er likely to  u n derm ine  the  
correspond ing  institu tions.
J . R a w l s , supra n o te  1, a t  278-79 .
123 See tex t accom panying  no tes 5 5 -5 9  supra.
m See H. St e p h e n s o n , T h e  C o m in g  C l a s h  (1972); T h e  M u l t i  N ational
F irm  and  t h e  N a t io n  Sta te  (G. P aq u e t ed. 1972).' In  a  d issent to  th e  dism issal of
certiorari on  g rounds of m ootness in  SEC v. M ed ica l C om m ittee  fo r  H u m a n  R ights, 
404 U.S. 403, 409 (1972) ( th e  p roxy  litiga tion  ov er D ow  C hem ical C om pany’s refusal 
to  subm it a  shareho lder p roposal requesting  th a t  D o w  cease m an u fac tu rin g  n a p a lm ), 
Mr. Jus tice  D ouglas observed: “ T h e  m o d e m  super-corporations, o f w hich  D ow  is one, 
w ield im m ense, v irtu a lly  unchecked , pow er. Som e say  th a t  they  a re  ‘p riv a te  govern­
m ents,* w hose decisions affec t th e  lives o f u s  all.”  See A. Be r le , E co no m ic  P o w er  
and  t h e  F r e e  So c iety  (1957); J. G a lbra ith , T h e  N e w  I n d u st r ia l  Sta te  (1967); 
M iller. Toward the “Techno-Corporate” State? —  An Essay in American Constitu­
tionalism, 14 V il l . L. R ev . 1 (1968).
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of justice bears on the giant corporation in that it requires a maximization 
of the expectations of the least favored individual, includes a just saving 
principle, and requires that inequalities be arranged so that they are at­
tached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity.128 Since Rawls’s first formulation of the principle provided 
for an economic system which satisfied the principle of efficiency but did 
not necessarily conform to his conception of justice,129 it is unclear whether 
the large modem corporation, presumably efficient, would satisfy the first 
formulation of the principle. It is clear, however, that the structure of 
such institutions does not meet the requirements of the second formula­
tion of the second principle. The modem “super-corporation” has “un­
dermined the preconceptions of classical economic theory as effectively as 
the quantum undermined classical physics at the beginning of the twen­
tieth century.”130 It has done so in a variety of ways. By virtue of dis­
persed stock ownership and the institutional power of entrenched manage­
ment, the nature of the shareholders5 property interest has changed from 
an entrepreneurial to an investment interest. Because of the separation of 
ownership and control131 and the wealth accumulation ability of large 
corporations, the proprietary interest of shareholders mandated by the 
law no longer equates with legal or economic reality.132 Management 
power has grown so much that management may accurately be charac­
terized as a self-perpetuating oligarchy with generally unchecked power to 
make significant wealth transfer decisions.133
The political, social, and economic costs of such enterprises are becom­
ing increasingly apparent. Measured solely on a basis of economic effi­
ciency, an illusory practice indulged in by an army of economists devoted 
to a form of scientism necessitating the exclusion of quantitatively im­
measurable costs,134 many giant firms and their means of production,
128 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
129 See tex t accom panying notes 49—56 supra.
180 Means, Collective Capitalism and Economic Theorys in T h e  C o r p o r a t io n  T a k e ­
O v e r  67 (A. Hacker ed. 1964). See E. S c h u m a c h e r ,  supra note 97, at 227—38.
131 See A. B e r l e  & G. M e a n s ,  T h e  M o d e r n  C o r p o r a t io n  a n d  P r iv a te  P r o p e r ty  
(2d ed. 1968).
1X1 See Flynn, Corporate Democracy: Nice Work I f  You Can Get Its in C o r p o r a t e  
P o w e r  i n  A m e ric a  94 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973). Adolph Berle has asked: 
"Why have stockholders? What contribution do they make, entitling them to 
heirship to half the profits of the industrial system, receivable partly in the 
form of dividends, and partly in the form of increased market values result­
ing from undistributed corporate gains? Stockholders toil not, neither do they 
spin, to earn that reward. They are beneficiaries by position only.
Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 C o lu m . L. R ev . 1, 16 (1965). See 
Chayes, The Modem Corporation and The Rule of Law, in T h e  C o r p o r a t io n  in  
M o d e r n  S o c ie ty  25 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
133 F o r exam ple, one com m enta to r a ttr ib u te s  th e  1956 recession in  p a r t  to th e  m an u ­
fac tu rin g  decisions m a d e  by th e  au to  m anufactu rers. A. Be r l e , T h e  T h r e e  F aces 
o f  P o w er  31 n.2 (1 9 6 7 ) . O th e r  estim ates o f m anagem en t pow er in  large co rpora­
tions to  ex trac t excessive profits from  consum ers fo r co rp o ra te  use r u n  in to  th e  billions 
o f dollars annually . See M . M in tz  & J . C o h e n ,  A m erica , I n c .  124—50 (1 9 7 1 ) ;  B. 
M oore , A M odest P roposal F o r  T h e  R efo rm  of th e  C ap ita lis t System, 1974 (m im eo, 
C en te r fo r th e  S tudy  o f C ap ita lis t In s titu tio n s).
See A u s tin , The Emergence of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U.L. R e v . 903 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; 
n o te  102 supra.
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management, and levels of technology appear to offer society quantum 
increases of economic benefits. The failure to include externalities such 
as pollution, psychological and physical damage to employees, and the 
loss of other intangible values may misrepresent the true value of large 
size or the economic advantages of large investments necessitated by com­
plex technology. For example, the market price and labor input to pro­
duce a ton of coal may be cut dramatically by the use of complex and ex­
pensive continuous mining technology. Continuous mining machines, 
however, may exact a terrible toll from those who must operate the 
machines, and strip mining exacts a major environmental cost for several 
generations.135 These often substantial costs are usually externalized by 
virtue of the large firm’s ability to shift them to the government in the 
form of welfare benefits for the human derelicts created or to subsequent 
generations and the ecosystem in the form of a bleak and polluted land­
scape. A form of risk shifting and wealth distribution takes place that is 
directly traceable to the political and social power inevitably lodged in 
the hands of large corporations with unchecked economic power. Unless 
and until the excessive political and economic power of concentrated in­
dustries and unions is brought under control, the measurement of eco­
nomic efficiencies will remain a titillating but false exercise, and a more 
just distribution of society’s wealth will be beyond the capability of our 
political processes.
Under Rawls’s system, even if the giant corporation is efficient in a 
utilitarian economic sense, it might not satisfy the principle of justice be­
cause of the priority of justice over efficiency.136 Large corporations no 
longer, and probably never did, fit the legal and economic models estab­
lished for them, premised on roughly just distribution of benefits and bur­
dens. The giant corporation is only theoretically owned by shareholders 
and managed by their elected representatives for a profit in a model of 
entrepreneurial symmetry. The shareholders do not own or control these 
corporations; they do not even contribute risk capital since most of the 
capital of super-corporations is internally generated through use of tax 
gimmicks or debt financing. Shares in such enterprises do not represent 
an investment of risk capital in the firm, but rather participation in the 
legalized gambling of the stock market. Officers and directors are not 
elected by shareholders, but constitute a self-perpetuating oligarchy an­
swerable to no one. Large corporations have become perpetual wealth 
accumulation machines, owning over two-thirds of our productive wealth 
and wielding vast influence over our lives.137 General Motors and two 
hundred other corporations with annual revenues in excess of one billion
133 See statement of Arnold Miller, Hearings on. Controls or Competition, Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 4, at 142 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
123 See J. R a w l s , supra note 1, a t 261; Nell, The Fall of the House of Efficiency,
409 A n n a l s  102 (1973).
337 See R . B a r b er , T h e  A m e r ic a n  C o r p o r a t io n  (1970); M . M in t z  & J. C o h e n , 
A m e r ic a , I n c . (1971).
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dollars should no longer be looked upon as benign economic endeavors, 
enveloped in the mystiques of free enterprise and private property. G.M.’s 
yearly operating revenues exceed those of all but a few countries; its sales 
receipts are greater than the combined revenues of New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware and the six New England states; it employs 
in excess of 700,000 employees in 172 plants in forty-six countries.138 Its 
political and economic power is so great that one observer has suggested 
that “General Motors could buy Delaware . . .  if DuPont were willing to 
seU it.”139
The economic, political, and social consequences of the development of 
the modem corporation are coming under increased criticism elsewhere.140 
It is sufficient here to suggest that the giant corporation has become a 
principal engine of distributive injustice in our society and a growing 
threat to individual liberty. It has become such by distributing increments 
of wealth to those who have done nothing to earn that wealth, contrary 
to the original legal assumptions of the corporate institution; it has be­
come a source of undue political and economic power on the national and 
international scene, and its internal organization is leading to a denial of 
individuality and a rebirth of status rights and liabilities reminiscent of 
feudalism.141 Philosophy, law, and economics have largely ignored the 
fundamental issues raised by the evolution of the modem super-corpora­
tion and continue to measure the operation and effects of the large cor­
poration by the mythology of “free enterprise,” “property rights,” and the 
personification of the giant corporation in Adam Smith terminology. 
Measuring the modem corporation by Rawls’s principle of equality quick­
ly demonstrates how far it has departed from its original legal and eco­
nomic base and underscores the need for restructuring the giant corpora­
tion in light of a more empirical examination of its economic and institu­
tional effects. If restructuring is to take place, it must proceed upon a 
consideration of who should “own” the super-corporation, to whom and 
for what ends its management is responsible, what control devices are 
appropriate, and how to strike the proper balance between economic 
efficiency, human liberty, and distributive justice within its legal and eco­
nomic structure.
D. Reform of the Competitive Process
A fourth institution in need of serious reform is the so-called free com­
petitive market, which allocates resources and sets prices efficiently, while 
promoting maximum equal liberty and equality of opportunity.142 What­
138 R . B a rb e r ,  supra n o te  137, a t  19-20.
133 Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in C o r p o r a t e  P o w e r  in  A m e ric a  67,
79 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973).
140 See E. S c h u m a c h e r ,  supra note 97; Flynn, supra note 132.
141 See Miller, Courts and Corporate Accountability, in C o r p o r a t e  P o w e r  in  
A m e ric a  198 (IL Nader & M. Green eds. 1973).
142 See J. R a w l s ,  supra note 1, at 270-74.
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ever fundamental theory a particular society may choose to organize its 
economic affairs, it must recognize that
[h]ow m en  work together now  to satisfy their present desires affects th e  
desires they will have la te r on, [determines] th e  kinds of persons they
will b e----- Since economic arrangem ents have these effects, an d  indeed
m ust do  so, th e  choice o f these institutions involves Some view of hum an 
good a n d  o f the  design o f institutions to  realize it. T h is  choice must, 
therefore, be m ade on  m oral an d  political as w ell a s  on  economic 
grounds.143
Rawls adopts, as the guiding principle for the private sector, reliance 
upon “a system of markets in which prices are freely determined by sup­
ply and demand,35144 while acknowledging that the operation of this free 
market concept does not necessarily require private ownership of the in­
struments of production145 In this way, Rawls sees a free market system 
as efficient in the economic sense and, “given the requisite background 
institutions. . .  consistent with equal liberties and fair equality of oppor­
tunity.”146 Rawls does not adopt the market system as a philosophical 
imperative, but as a practical necessity for efficiently managing a complex 
economy.
There is considerable doubt as to the existence of a free market system
— in the sense of free consumer choices dictating price and allocation 
decisions while maximizing equal liberties and fair equality of oppor­
tunity — in vast sectors of the American economy. Important segments 
of the economy are subsidized or regulated by the government, often at 
the instance of the industry regulated147 High levels of economic concen­
tration exist in major segments of the nonregulated economy as well,148 
imposing inefficiencies, limiting equality of opportunity, and posing sub­
113 Id. at 259—60. Theodore Rosak, in his introduction to Schumacher’s book at­
tempting to humanize economic thinking, captures the same thought:
He [Schumacher] reminds us that economics has only become scientific by 
becoming statistical. But at the bottom of its statistics, sunk well out of sight, 
are so many sweeping assumptions about people like you and me —  about our 
■needs and motivations and the purpose we have given our lives. Again and 
again Schumacher insists that economics as it is practiced todays —  whether 
it is socialist or capitalist economics —  is a “derived body of thought.” I t  is 
derived from dubious “meta-economic” preconceptions regarding man and 
'nature that are never questioned, that dare not be questioned if economic 
science is to be the science it puiports to be rather than (as it should be) a 
humanistic social wisdom that trusts to experienced intuition* plays by ear, 
and risks a moral exhortation or two.
E. Sc h u m a c h e r , supra n o te  97, a t  8.
Ui J. R a w l s ,  supra note 1, at 270.
143 Id. a t  271.
Id. a t  272.
147See T h e  M o n o p o l y  M a k e r s  (M . Green ed. 1973); W. A d a m s  & H. G r a y , 
M o n o p o l y  in  A m e r ic a  (1955).
iaSee J. B l a ir , E c o n o m ic  C o n c e n t r a t io n  (1972); C . K a y s e n  & D. T u r n e r , 
A n t it r u s t  P o l ic y ; A n  E c o n o m ic  a n d  L e g a l  A n a l y s is  (-1959); C o r p o r a t e  P o w e r  
in  A m e r ic a  (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1972), See generally3 Hearings on. Economic 
Concentration Pursuant to S. Res. 262 Before the Sub comm, on Antitrust and Monopo­
ly of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. I-V III (1964-
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stantial risks to the equality of individual liberties. One estimate has 
placed the “dead-weight welfare loss attributable to monopoly in the 
United States. . .  somewhere between five-tenths and two percent of the 
gross national product. . .  .”149 Others have suggested that our inability 
to maintain full employment without excessive inflation through the 
“fine tuning55 of monetary and fiscal policy is directly attributable to the 
existence of excessive market power in the economy,150 which subverts 
the economic advantage of efficiency upon which Rawls predicates his 
advocacy of a free market to govern economic arrangements. The current 
state of the United States and world economy and the maldistribution of 
wealth’ clearly suggest that the rough equilibrium of economic arrange­
ments sought by competitive markets with the excesses curbed by rational 
governmental intervention to prevent waste has not been achieved.
The effects of unchecked economic power resulting from the destruc­
tion of workable competition by unwise government intervention in the 
market and the growth of giant corporations reach far beyond the eco­
nomic inefficiencies and resource misallocations that artificial competitive 
models predict. The maintenance of a free market system has perhaps 
even more significance to the preservation of liberty and equality of op­
portunity, as Rawls acknowledges,151 than to the efficient management of 
a complex technologically-based society. Where the unchecked growth 
of concentrated economic power converts the economy from one of free 
choice to dictated choice, individual mobility, freedom of choice, and in­
dividual liberty are greatly lessened.152 Recent events in the political and 
economic sphere, when coupled with the pervasive scope of economic con­
centration in the American economy, clearly indicate the need either to 
reestablish a competitive market economy in the United States and other 
major areas of the world or to pay an ever increasing price in the form of 
resource misallocations, arbitrary wealth transfers, overall economic in­
efficiencies, and a decline in equality of opportunity and individual liberty.
IV. C o n c l u s io n
We have attempted to analyze the distributive aspects of Rawls's theory 
of justice and to highlight some basic institutions of our society in need of 
fundamental reform in light of the theory. By emphasizing the institu­
tional implications of the distributive aspects of Rawls’s work, an exami­
nation of other important aspects of his truly impressive exposition of a 
rationally based and affirmatively stated theory of justice must be abjured. 
By attempting a comprehensive exposition of the theory and the philo­
149 F . S c h e r e r ,  I n d u s t r i a l  M a r k e t  S t r u c t u r e  a n d  E co n o m ic  P e r f o r m a n c e  
404 (1970).
160 Hearings on The Industrial Reorganization Act Before the Subcomm. on Anti­
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary} 93d Gong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 
at 45 (1973) (statement of W. Mueller).
151 J. R a w l s ,  supra note 1, at 272.
152 See 1972 Hearings, supra note 135; Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 
C o lu m . L. R ev . 377 (1965); Miller, supra note 127.
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sophical assumptions underlying the process of analysis and the conclu­
sions reached, Rawls’s work constitutes a substantial contribution to law 
and philosophy and is certain to provoke constructive thought and criti­
cism of far reaching consequences.153
We have isolated Rawls’s concept of distributive justice in the hope 
that an examination of this aspect of his work may help provide insights 
to enable the intelligent reform of significant institutions in our society 
which have gone awry. We have lost a consensus on an ethic of distribu­
tive justice in our culture and, as a result, we risk sinking into a new form 
of fuedalism where the rights and dignity of the individual are made sub­
servient to monolithic institutions, a political or economic elite, or a  mind­
less and onrushing technocracy. In  grappling with the conundrum of 
preserving individualism in an ever more complex and interdependent 
society, which is currently under great economic stress, we need a renewed 
consensus of justice — one which does not exalt efficiency154 meritocracy, 
or group utility as the primary end of social and economic justice. Rather, 
we need a consensus which guarantees just institutions capable of restrict­
ing inequalities to those inequalities for the reasonable benefit of all, while 
preserving individual liberty. John Rawls has provided us with rationally 
based principles by which relatively rapid and orderly progress to a just 
society may be made, progress which may avert dangers to civilization 
which exist in the present circumstances.
153 The most recent critique is an exhaustive examination of Rawls’s concept of law. 
Hermann, The Fallacy of Legal Procedure as Predominant Over Substantive Justice: 
A Critique of “The Rule of Law9* in John Rawls* A T h e o r y  o f  J u s t ic e . 23 D e P a u l  
L. Rev. 1408 (1974).
*** See Nellj supra note 136.
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